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Abstract: This paper aims to illuminate and provide a critical assessment of the 
nationalist discourse on declining population in Bulgaria. Nationalist discourse is 
one of the mainstream approaches in Bulgaria and is widely spread through mass 
media having been voiced by renowned intellectuals, policy experts, scholars and 
media celebrities. It can be recognised in the political programmes of left-wing and 
nationalist parties, but also in governmental documents at both national as well as 
regional levels. The nationalistically oriented advocates articulate current concerns 
regarding the declining birth rates and declining population in the country label-
ling the demographic situation as “Bulgarian national catastrophe” and “Bulgaria’s 
collapse”. They place an emphasis on the decreasing proportion of ethnic Bulgar-
ians and the growth of the ethnic minorities, especially Roma. The latter trend was 
labelled by the derogatory term “gypsyisation”, i.e. a distortion of the Bulgarian 
nation and shrinkage of its core ethnicity – ethnic Bulgarians. The threat of the “gyp-
syisation” of the Bulgarian nation has not only been viewed in quantitative terms, 
but also through the lens of an alleged worsening of the national human capital (e.g. 
level of education, professional skills and civic culture of the population). Another 
set of arguments exploited in the nationalist discourse is the diminishing size of the 
Bulgarian nation as a threat to national sovereignty, territorial unity and economic 
stability. 
We use a qualitative content analysis and thematic analysis of media textual 
materials in order to reconstruct the main ideas, arguments and strategies of the 
proponents of the nationalist discourse regarding the consequences of the declin-
ing population in Bulgaria, its social policy implications and future demographic 
prospects.
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Population decline and ethno-stratifi cation in Bulgaria after 1990 
The transition period in Bulgaria was characterised by profound transformations 
in all aspects of social life. Severe economic downturn, skyrocketing infl ation, and 
high unemployment rates in the mid-1990s followed by mass impoverishment and 
signifi cant deterioration of living standards were the main features of the crisis-led 
societal transformations. These transformations also had a signifi cant impact on the 
demographic development of the country. After 1990, the rate of natural increase 
became negative. This trend persisted throughout the whole period of the last two 
decades. In 2012, the rate of natural increase reached -5.5‰ (Demographic pro-
cesses 2013). 
As stated by D. Coleman and R. Rowthorn (2011: 219): “Population decline can 
arise from any combination of low birth rates, high death rates, and net emigra-
tion. In the modern world, low birth rates are the key”. This combination of factors 
shaped Bulgaria’s demographic development from the beginning of the 1990s on-
wards. The persistent population decline witnessed in the country after 1990 has 
been caused by the intensifi ed process of emigration, increasing levels of mortality 
and changes in reproductive models associated with postponement of the onset 
of reproduction and reduction in the number of children the contemporary young 
people choose to have. In particular, it has been estimated that for the period 1990-
2005 the population loss due to out-migration exceeds one million (out of 7 369431 
according to the last census of 01/02/2011). The trend of emigration has been ex-
tremely intensive in the initial years of the transition period. 
The population decline in the country has also been caused by the increasing 
trends of mortality. The situation is particularly dramatic because mortality has re-
tained at a very high level of above 14‰, reaching 15.0‰ in 2012 (the highest crude 
death rate in Europe) with no signs of improvement in the coming years (Demo-
graphic processes 2013). The increase of mortality rates was triggered by several 
underlying processes – deterioration of the health status of the population due to a 
signifi cant drop of living standards and population ageing associated with a process 
of fertility reduction and changes in the cohort size that had been in effect long be-
fore the societal transition. 
Important differentials in mortality following the increasing social inequalities in 
the country have been discussed in the literature as well. Ethno-stratifi cation of the 
Bulgarian post-socialist society and the increasing inequalities between the three 
main ethnic groups in the country (Bulgarian, Turkish and Roma) is also refl ected by 
diverging mortality trends. The national statistics recorded excessively higher in-
fant mortality and also signifi cantly lower life expectancy at birth among the ethnic 
Roma. These inequalities continued to reproduce and increased even further over 
the last two decades (Table 1). 
Substantial ethnic differentials are observed in fertility trends as well. The Roma 
minority has the highest level of fertility (Table 1). Koytcheva and Philipov (2008: 
373) point out also that “Roma often enter into motherhood as teenagers, while for 
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the Turks the mean age at entry is between 20 and 21, and Bulgarians start child-
bearing above age 23 on average. Also, in the second half of the 1990s we observe 
a rise in the mean age at fi rst birth that is especially evident for the Bulgarians and 
the Roma”.
The sharp decrease of the Total Fertility Rate (TFR) recorded since the early 
1990s marked the end of the two-child family model as previously dominant com-
positional characteristic of the Bulgarian family. Since 1990, the TFR dropped from 
a stable level of approximately two children per woman that prevailed during the 
socialist times leading to the “lowest low fertility level” less then 1.3 children per 
woman (Kohler et al. 2002: 641-680) in the mid-1990s. In 2012, after a period of slight 
increase, the national TFR reached the level of 1.50 children per woman (Demo-
graphic Processes 2013). 
The changes in the number of children born in today’s Bulgarian families involved 
mainly higher-order fertility, and in particular, second births. Among the young gen-
erations today, the second birth is increasingly postponed and even foregone. Sev-
eral studies show that the arrival of the second child in the family could be seen as 
an intersection of enlarging social inequalities in modern Bulgarian society (Koytch-
eva/Philipov 2008; Dimitrova 2012). In particular, the advancing ethno-stratifi cation 
of the Bulgarian post-socialist society turned reproduction into a socially stratifi ed 
phenomenon that follows the increasing social inequalities between different ethnic 
groups. Until recently Roma women who experienced the most severe socio-eco-
nomic deprivation continued to have signifi cantly increased probability of second 
and higher order births compared to the women from the other two ethnic groups in 
the country, although the analysis reveals that in the Roma ethnic group, the decline 
in higher-order fertility has also been occurring after 1990 (Dimitrova 2011).
All these changes in the demographic profi le of the country and the persistent 
ethnic differentials in fertility, witnessed in particular after 1990, focused the atten-
tion of experts, policy makers, and civil society. The issue of population decline 
and exceptionally plummeting fertility became a subject converging the discourses 
Tab. 1: Main demographic characteristics of Bulgarian, Turkish and Roma 
ethnic groups in Bulgaria
 Bulgarians Turks Roma
Share in the total population (2011) in %1 84.8 8.8 4.9
Total fertility rate (2001)2 1.1 2.3 3.0
Average number of children – women age at 45-49 (2011)1 1.6 2.0 2.8
Average number of children – women age at 65-69 (2011)1 1.8 2.6 3.2
Mean age at fi rst birth (2000)2 24.2 21.1 20.1
Infant mortality rate (2003) in %3 9.9 17.0 28.0
Life expectancy at birth (1999-2001)3 71.8 - 61.8
Source: 1 Population Census Report 2011; 2 Koytcheva/Philipov 2008: 373-374; 3 National 
Health Strategy for People Belonging to Ethnic Minorities 2005-2012.
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of various stakeholders on searching means to counteract further negative demo-
graphic implications. On the other hand, higher birth rates and the worsening living 
conditions for raising children in the families of the Roma minority raise public con-
cerns. Reproductive models in other minorities, especially the Turks, do not attract 
politicians’ attention as they go in line with overall demographic trends.
1.2 Methodology
In this paper, our main research question is “How is Bulgaria’s population decline 
after 1990 framed in the context of nationalist discourse?” Thus, our focus is on the 
content of public speech on “demographic crisis”, on comprehensions of demo-
graphical trends and their social effects rather than on the objective measurements 
of demographic data. “Discourses are practices that generate the things (e.g. the 
“population”) […] [they] exert describable effects [….] they are no nature-given units 
but owe their existence to specifi c historical constellations [….]” (Etzemuller 2011: 
102). Our aim is to extract the main traits of the nationalist rhetoric on the “popula-
tion problem” that is embedded into a conception of “demography as construction” 
(Etzemuller 2011: 101). In this vein, it is interesting to understand how the “demo-
graphic crisis” is articulated in the frame of nationalism.
The demographic structure of the nation represents a key element in nationalist 
mode of thinking. Thus, it is not surprising that the nationalist visions and inter-
pretations of the “population problem” prevail in a context of the upheaval of “na-
tionalising nationalisms” of the political space of today’s post-communist European 
countries, in which the dismantling of the socialist state unlocked ethnic tensions 
previously suppressed by the totalitarian regimes (Brubaker 2004). 
After a brief macro-level analysis of the expected outcomes of the persisting 
population decrease in a long-term perspective, which has been labelled a “de-
mographic crisis” in the public discourse, the paper outlines the main conceptu-
alisations of nationalism and the ideas of a nation’s reproduction and ethnic ho-
mogeneity in the framework of “politics of reproduction”. The conceptualisation of 
population shrinkage and population ageing as a societal and national “threat” is 
presented in a “apocalyptic demography” that has been used to “reconstruct and 
redefi ne social problems in ways that fi t a political agenda or, at least, that calibrate 
with current and popular ideological positions” (Gee 2002: 750; see also Gee/Gut-
man 2000; Vincent 1996). In the post-socialist Bulgarian context, it is the nationalist 
ideology that addresses all social and economic problems by reference to the “de-
mographic crisis”. And vice versa, current talk about demography is void if national-
ist thinking is not present in it.
In the empirical section of the paper, we try to extract different themes and nu-
ances of interpretations/representations of the term “demographic crisis” within the 
framework of nationalist thought. Particularly, we will try to reconstruct the man-
ners in which the topics related to the country’s population shrinkage are framed in 
offi cial positions of experts/researchers and politicians as well as in the vox populi 
represented in online forums and blogs.
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Data collected for this analysis include thematic discussions in electronic media, 
internet forums, and blogs as well as the offi cial speeches and media publications 
by leaders of the VMRO1 – a party that falls in the extreme right of the political spec-
trum. The party describes itself as a nationalist and patriotic organisation, whose 
mission is the country’s demographic development and the defence of the Bulgar-
ian values including the protection of the traditional Bulgarian family. The reason for 
choosing the VMRO as a representative nationalist party of the Bulgarian political 
landscape is that the party has developed a very detailed programme/strategy on 
the country’s demographic future and it is very active in public debates with demo-
graphic reference covered on e-media, TV and printing press. Although the VMRO 
has not been in Parliament for the last decade, an analysis of the party’s statements 
might be useful as it is assumed that they contain the archetypical structure of na-
tionalist discourse in Bulgaria. In the last 3 years, the VMRO leaders present them-
selves not only as politicians but as researchers when presenting a demographic 
expertise in the public.
The method that we use to analyse the collected material is a qualitative content 
analysis of textual materials (Mayring 2000; Keller 2005). We have set Google Alerts 
to receive all articles on the “population topic” and, for the aim of this research, we 
only chose articles in Bulgarian, published online between 1st October 2011 and 1st 
June 2012. Additionally, we gathered further online publications from this period, 
which were not found by the Google Alerts. In order to fi nd these online publi-
cations, we entered the following search terms in Google: “demographic crisis”, 
“demographic policy” and “fertility in Bulgaria”. Our material comprises newspa-
pers (e.g. interviews, author’s articles), videos (e.g. textual materials from television 
programs), forums and blogs as well as informational websites. Our fi nal sample 
consisted of 317 articles. 
The collected material was downloaded and the contents were thematically ana-
lysed by Atlas.ti (v.7.0). The coding scheme tracked such categories as: general in-
formation about each article (informative, argumentative, discussion), tone of the 
article (optimistic/positive, neutral/balanced, pessimistic/negative), concerns and 
fears (explicit, implicit), accuracy of information conveyed, sources cited, (possible) 
solutions/recommendations. Our coding identifi ed and summarised the content of 
the materials under three main sub-categories/modes of thinking: nationalist, (neo)
liberal and state-interventionist.2 For example, the material was coded as national-
ist if expressions like “ethnicity”, “minority”, “ethnic ratio”, “ethnic rights” are used 
to express the superiority of a certain national ethnic group. According to our three 
“deductive categories” (Mayring 2000), we identifi ed 66 individual articles as “na-
tionalist” (of which 21 were published on the VMRO website) and discursively ana-
lysed their content.
1 VMRO-Bulgarian National Movement is one of the oldest political parties in Bulgaria founded 
more than 100 years ago as a national organisation of liberation of Bulgarians in Macedonia. 
2 A comparative analysis of nationalist, (neo)liberal and state-interventionist framing patterns is 
not the purpose of this paper and must be conducted in another article.
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2 The focus on “demographic crisis” rhetoric instead of “national 
population decline”
The importance and the anticipated negative consequences of the long-lasting trend 
of depopulation for all spheres of the Bulgarian society have been widely discussed 
for more than two decades. The public discourse on the country’s demographic 
situation is characterised by an extreme terminology. It is described as a “national 
catastrophe”, “collapse of the nation” or “heavy crisis” rather than more neutrally as 
“population decline” or “depopulation”.
 Although the decrease in fertility and the increase in mortality, which presum-
ably caused the recent demographic developments have already taken place in the 
1970s and 1980s, the strongest effects became visible at the beginning of the 21st 
century. 
The population decrease beginning in the early 1990s continued in the fi rst dec-
ade of the 21st century despite a minor increase in fertility in the period 2004-2009 
(celebrated by the national media as a “baby boom”) and a decreasing emigration 
during the same period. Public concerns about the severity of the population de-
cline are additionally reinforced by two statistics. First, even the optimistic variant of 
the demographic forecasts prepared by the National Statistical Institute in Bulgaria 
predict that the negative population growth will continue uninterruptedly until 2060. 
Second, of all EU countries, Bulgaria showed the lowest negative natural growth for 
the last decade and in the World Bank population analyses the country has been 
ranked as the EU country with the highest pace of population loss. Coleman and 
Rowthorn (2011: 220, 238) point out that “[…] a rate of decline of 0.5 percent per 
year seems quite rapid in the context of historical and current experience”. Bulgaria 
is the only EU country experiencing an annual total population decline of -4.41‰. 
The public discourse on the “demographic crisis” is associated mainly with a 
steep fertility decline, which is interpreted as a response to severe economic hard-
ships and low living standards during the last two decades. Moreover, in a broader 
context, the label of “demographic crisis” has been used as a landmark connoting 
transformations with negative consequences in all areas of social life. The fear of 
a “demographic crisis” penetrates public debates on most important issues. It is 
closely related to unemployment, generally low salaries and pensions, expensive 
dwelling, scarcity of childcare services in big cities, etc. For a number of reasons, 
the “population problem” has been considered as particularly severe: 
• First of all, the demographic crisis is characterised by its comprehensive-
ness. It has an impact on all spheres and institutions of the Bulgarian society. 
It affects the labour market, the educational sphere, the healthcare system, 
the national pension system, and the social care system. For example, it has 
led to several important changes in the area of education. From 1990 on-
wards, many kindergartens and schools in small towns and villages closed 
down because of the low number of enrolled children; many schools faced a 
decrease of the in-class size, which led to amalgamating schools and classes 
and a decreasing quality of education. In the last 3-4 years, the consequenc-
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es of persistently low fertility are actively discussed by authorities of the 
higher education system. Again, the signifi cantly low number of registered 
students applying and enrolling in Bulgarian universities has been seen as an 
outcome of the “demographic crisis”. The shortage of labour force in certain 
segments of the labour market, the signifi cant drop of working age popula-
tion paralleled by a substantial increase of the number of people at retire-
ment age have been expected to lead to long-lasting defi cits in the national 
pension funds and the national insurance system in the future. Finally, the 
gloomy statistics assume that in the country’s demographic “future”, in addi-
tion to the 200 settlements, which have been deserted over the last 20 years 
another 1000 rural settlements will be depopulated in the next 10 years. To 
summarise, every problem that has evolved in any social sphere of the Bul-
garian society has been considered as an outcome of the “demographic cri-
sis”. 
• Much attention has been paid to population ageing as one of the most nega-
tive aspects of the country’s “demographic crisis”. Mass media comprehen-
sively cite offi cial sources of information that Bulgaria is among the world’s 
top 5 countries with the highest percentage of people above the age of 65. 
The advanced process of population ageing constitutes a solid argument 
for public offi cials to justify the lack of progress in never-ending chaotic re-
forms in the health and pension system during the last 10 years. On the other 
hand, social experts alarm for other challenges stemming from ageing. The 
increase in the share of senior citizens raises the issue of providing them 
with economic stability and wellbeing. Evidently, the diminishing number 
of young cohorts entering the labour markets will face this challenge – a 
problem that can seriously erode social solidarity as a fundamental principle 
of modern society. Last but not least, the increasing importance of senior 
citizens’ votes in the national elections lead to increasing public attention 
to their needs and the development of future policies designed for elderly 
people (Krastev 2011). 
• Another key dimension of academic research and public discourse is the po-
tential decrease in the human capital of the next generations. Some scholars 
claim that the demographic crisis proceeds at different paces and affects 
the various social strata, regions and communities in the country in different 
ways (Mirchev 2010). This raises serious concerns about the quality of the 
human capital of the next generations as the current trends refl ect the ham-
pered reproduction of “genuine” Bulgarian citizens. In the same vein, differ-
ences at mortality have also been closely associated with increasing health 
inequalities among different social groups in Bulgaria.
However, the declining population is not a unique process exclusive to the Bul-
garian society. This process has also been witnessed in most European countries 
and presents fundamental challenges to them. In 2008, 14 countries in Europe face 
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population shrinkage including 12 East European countries together with Italy and 
Germany (Coleman/Rowthorn 2011: 220). Despite the fact that in the offi cial docu-
ments of the European Commission the terms “demographic crisis” and “demo-
graphic policy” are not used, these documents frequently discuss the need of fos-
tering population growth, to support Europe’s young people to have the number 
of children they desire, and to guarantee solidarity between generations (EC 2011). 
Unlike West European countries, and similarly to some ex-socialist countries, e.g. 
Russia (Isola 2008), in Bulgaria terms like “demographic crisis” and “demographic 
catastrophe” have become a central part of the debate on population decline. The 
“crisis” rhetoric echoes the country’s socialist past with its coercive pronatalist de-
mographic policy. Thus, in a situation when the “future of the nation” has been con-
sidered at stake due to population decline, the “crisis” rhetoric becomes relevant 
for persuasive and argumentative purposes in the discourses of public agents with 
nationalist attitudes. 
3 Nationalism and nation reproduction 
Before discussing the manner in which the “demographic crisis” is discursively con-
structed in some of the offi cial public discourses in the recent Bulgarian society we 
will briefl y touch upon the main conceptualizations of nationalism. Not aiming to 
delve in a comprehensive debate on nationalism, national state, ethnicity, etc. i.e. 
topics that lay beyond the scope of this paper, we rather briefl y elaborate on some 
main theses that we use as analytical instruments in our empirical analysis. 
Modern theorists of nationalism unanimously agree that nationalism is not a 
monolithic phenomenon. Further, it is not a universal but a “contextual” concept 
that encompasses different meanings and modes of development according to a di-
verse range of socio-cultural environments. Nationalism is shaped by national ide-
ologies around which different social movements unfold. The contextual nature of 
nationalism still allows for identifi cation of two different modes: western, rational, 
civic, territorial nationalism and eastern, organic, ethnic-genealogical nationalism 
(Smith 2000). Anthony Smith argues that ethnicity is a paramount premise in the 
formation of a nation, referring to the state-nation building model of Britain and 
France which were founded around a dominant ethnic group. Ethnicity defi ned as 
shared culture (common language, religion, customs), shared historical legacy, and 
a link to a specifi c territory (homeland) develops a strong sense of collective identity 
and solidarity. Stressing continuity between pre-modern ethnic groups and modern 
nations, Smith emphasises the core cohesive power of ethnic identity for the un-
folding of nationalism: “[…] as an ideological movement for attaining and maintain-
ing autonomy, unity and identity on behalf of a population […]” (Smith 2000: 25). 
In contrast to Smith’s ethno-centrist origin of nationalism, Ernest Gellner (1983: 
94) suggests that both modern nation-state model and nationalism had emerged 
due to political and cultural proximity of different ethnic groups, thus creating a new 
type of homogeneity. Nationalism based on territorial-political unity develops more 
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sources for national cohesion and integrity while ethnic rooted nationalism could 
cause energetic separatist and isolationist trends.
Resurgence of nationalism in post-communist societies has also reshaped a 
wide range of nationalist ideologies and movements in the globalised world. In 
studies on genealogy of “East European nationalisms”, social analysts stress the 
link between pre-communist and communist ideologies, the emergence of new 
emancipative ideas of subversion of previous forms of ideological colonisation, and 
state-nation building under the conditions of globalism (Altermatt 1998; Brubaker 
2004; Puhle 2008). Rogers Brubaker says about the revival of new nationalism in 
post-communist countries: “[…] nationalizing nationalisms include appeals on be-
half of one “main nation” or nationhood, defi ned in ethno-cultural sense and clearly 
detached from the community of citizens as a whole” (Brubaker 2004: 19).
Bulgarian studies on nationalism adopt the idea of the existence of a wide spec-
trum of nationalist views and sentiments. Nationalism has been comprehended in 
both positive, constructive and negative, destructive modes. According to Velev 
(2005: 6), a positive strand of modern nationalism is based on the idea of national 
unity, the defence of Bulgarian territorial integrity, and the construction of a modern 
national doctrine similar to the ideas of national independence and independent 
state building spread in times of Bulgaria’s pre-liberation from the Turkish Otto-
man Empire in the 19th century. An aggressive, destructive nationalism has been 
recognised as a mode of thinking that stirs up multiethnic tensions, confl icts, and 
xenophobic attitudes through language of hate and warlike rhetoric.
On the other hand, some sociologists (Kabakchieva 2008) observe a spread of 
strong nationalist attitudes among Bulgarians citing data from national representa-
tive studies, where Bulgarians avoid identifying with large communities, such as 
nation and state. Bulgarians demonstrate strong distrust in all public institutions; 
they are extremely disappointed by their political entities and leaders. Thus, it is 
argued that if nationalism had emerged in Bulgaria, it would hardly imply the identi-
fi cation with the state. Most Bulgarian people identify with their family settings and 
local communities that inspire the so-called “familial patriotism” instead of politi-
cally based nationalism. 
Gal and Kligman (2001: 25) mention that it is remarkable that modern theorists of 
nationalism – Anderson, Smith, Gellner, Hobsbaum, Horowitz – ignore gender and 
reproduction. In contrast, some scholars in cultural studies put strong emphasis on 
the reproduction of the nation, which becomes a focal point in the nationalist dis-
courses (Parker et al. 1992; Wilford/Miller 1998; Mayer 2000). In the second stream 
of theorising, biological reproduction has been discussed as a symbol of a nation’s 
vitality and strength and a nation’s liveliness considered as a social and genetic-bi-
ological entity. Decreased fertility of the nation has been viewed as stagnation of its 
vital potential, as a threat to gradual development, and as a symbol of the nation’s 
death (Gal/Kligman 2001; Rivkin-Fish 2010).
Women are at the centre of nationalist thought as they represent the biologi-
cal rejuvenation of the nation by reproducing cultural, lingual and gender identity 
and by becoming the allegorical emblem of the nation’s continuity. Mothers are the 
symbol of a nation’s viability, whereas women who do not reproduce indicate the 
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nation’s regress (Yuval-Davis 1997). Motherhood is viewed as the “primary form of 
female political agency” (Gal/Kligman 2001). Thus, nationalism claims control over 
women’s reproductive capacities and morally condemns women who do not want 
to reproduce. In the socialist regimes, the states exercised strict control over wom-
en’s bodies by making abortions illegal and restricting access to modern contracep-
tives. The socialist governments imposed an ideology that women were urged to 
have children in order to fulfi l their patriotic duty; giving birth in the name of the 
communist party and state.
The family metaphor is central to nationalist thinking (Gal/Kligman 2001). The 
family is an exceptional entity because nation can be characterised as a big family. 
Family interests are superior to individual interests because the nation has survived 
and existed due to the reproduction of the family. Moreover, the image of the fam-
ily is idealised as a traditional marital union where both parents raise children. All 
other types of family unions like monoparental family, homosexual family, or even 
childless family are ignored as they threaten the family’s reproductive potential. The 
nationalist debate on reproduction goes hand in hand with normative debate about 
who are the “correct” producers and citizens of the nation. 
Due to the effective enforcement mechanisms, modern nation-states exercise 
great power to regulate human reproduction, a process that Michel Foucault called 
“a biopolitics of the population” (Foucault 1990). Under the conditions of severe 
economic and political transformations and in face of population decline in most of 
East and Central European countries, politicians and leaders of the post-communist 
states debate how to stimulate women’s fertility and how to cope with the nega-
tive consequences of low birth rates. These debates assure political legitimacy and 
state authority over these tackling demographic issues. 
In the following sections we will analyse how the main characteristics of the 
nationalist discourse are constructed in the political agenda of VMRO and in the 
nationalist oriented talks in the internet forums. The centre of the nationalists’ dis-
course is the “Roma problem”, particularly the Roma minority’s (fast) reproduction 
as a “threat” to the Bulgarian welfare and the people’s wellbeing.3
4 Nation and Roma ethnicity 
4.1 “Gypsy issue at the heart of the demographic policy”
The idea for ethnic homogeneity of the leading ethnic community takes a central 
role in the ethnonational vision of the nation. The higher birth-rate among the ethnic 
minorities combined with the lower fertility of the “dominant” ethnic group give 
3 The “Roma problem” is also discussed in Hungary and Romania, where a large number of Hun-
garian and Romanian Roma live. The nationalists are actively involved in discussing minority 
policies in these countries by constantly producing negative stereotypes of Roma (Madroane 
2012; Denes 2011)
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the nationalists rise to concern. They fear that the ethnic ratio in the country could 
change and turn the minority into majority. This worry is expressed by the claim 
of “expulsion and replacement of the Bulgarian people by the Gypsy ethnic group” 
(VMRO 2012). This concern permeates a large portion of the attitudes and opinions 
on the demographic crisis in Bulgaria. This view is most openly articulated by the 
VMRO leaders, e.g. “Bulgarian children on the verge of extinction”, “Bulgarian popu-
lation is dying out”, “Today – a Muslim Netherlands, tomorrow a Gypsy Bulgaria”, 
“SOS for Bulgarians”, “Dobrudhza is depopulated and overrun by Gypsies”, “One 
million less ethnic Bulgarians since the last census” (VMRO 2012). In VMRO’s main 
document – “Bulgaria 2050 – demographic strategy project” the “Gypsy issue” is 
presented both from a quantitative perspective – the higher ethnic birth-rate – and 
from a qualitative aspect of the human capital – the ghetthoisation and marginalisa-
tion of this group: 
“This is only the quantitative side of the problem. Unfortunately it has a 
qualitative, a social side as well, because there is a twofold model of re-
production in Bulgaria. On one hand, the larger population group has a low 
birth-rate (for ethnic Bulgarian it is below 7% [sic]) which is rather insuffi -
cient for reproduction. On the other hand, the socially isolated and margin-
alised strata, which mainly consists of Gypsies, make 8% of the population, 
but give 20% of the live births and these shares are constantly increasing. 
This leads to further ghetthoisation of this group and does not help solving 
their problems in any way.” (VMRO 2012) 
Although the consequences of the “demographic crisis” are presented from a 
broader perspective – population ageing, increased retirement age, strains on wel-
fare funds, prevalence of infertility among large number of Bulgarian families, prob-
lems with national security, migration pressure, and others – all these questions 
are deduced from the main problem identifi ed by VMRO – the “disappearance of 
ethnic Bulgarians” and the impending “Gypsy threat” over the Bulgarian nation. On 
the VMRO’s website the demographic crisis in Bulgaria is analysed and discussed 
in detail and a special subsection called the “Gypsy Issue” is dedicated to this topic. 
There are “5+1 urgent measures” proposed on the site, including combining child 
benefi ts with compulsory schooling and minimal living conditions, introducing dif-
ferent forms of community service in cases of insolvency and unpaid bills, penalties 
cutting social benefi ts and abolishing the equal treatment before the law of this 
ethnic group. These steps defi ne the VMRO’s proposed governmental policy for 
the integration of the Roma population, viewed as part of the effi cient demographic 
policy.
The claim of anticipated ethnic dominance of Roma over ethnic Bulgarians is also 
constructed using statements of foreigners visiting Bulgaria. This view is exempli-
fi ed in the words of a famous British journalist, who presents Bulgaria as a country 
where half of the population is “Gypsy”: 
“A scandalous fi lm on BBC presented Bulgaria like a Gypsy country. The 
author is the British journalist Michael Palin famous as one of the actors of 
“Monty Python”. His “picture” of our country steered a controversy at home 
and abroad. “Bulgaria is famous mostly with the fact that a lot of Gypsies 
live there. In this country they represent almost half of the population”, said 
the author of the Eastern Delight fi lm, reports Bulgarian National Radio” 
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(Demographic Collapse in Bulgaria. In: http://forum.framar.bg, Date of pub-
lication 12.1.2012)
The “gypsyisation” of Bulgaria is viewed as a weakening of the cultural and his-
torical power of the Bulgarian population and as a serious threat to the foundations 
of the state and the historic legacy of the country:
“The problem is not only in the depopulation. The Bulgarian statehood de-
grades as well. In more and more municipalities, Bulgarians are a minority. 
There, they are oppressed and discriminated. In the not too far future, the 
bigger part of the population of our homeland will not understand Bulgar-
ian. […..] Because the demise of Bulgarians means the disappearance of 
fi fteen hundred years of Bulgarian civilisation and the end of the third Bul-
garian state.” (Kostadinov, Kostadin. In: Desant (Debark) Newspaper, Date 
of publication 26.2.2012)
Thus, in the VMRO’s language on the “demographic crisis” we recognise a clas-
sic Malthus’ discourse on population marked by the fear of irrationally high fertility 
of the lower strata, which poses a threat to the living conditions of the civilised 
middle-class of the Bulgarian society. The nationalists use the Malthusian argumen-
tation of class-differentiated fertility in order to warn about the increase of allegedly 
inferior human capital, which would, in turn, result in the overall downgrading of the 
nation and the state. Thus, the VMRO’s population discourse reproduces the main 
worries of the “apocalyptic demography”: the shrinking of the superior, i.e. middle- 
and upper-class population and the expanding of the inferior, “socially problematic” 
population. The VMRO’s discourse on population is not new – this mode has shaped 
the political thinking about the population in Western Europe and the USA since the 
19th century until today (Etzemuller 2011)
4.2 “The covert genocide turned into a fi nancial one”
The perceived “gypsyisation” of Bulgaria embodies another painful topic in the 
popular consciousness of Bulgarian citizens – the aspired distribution of common 
goods according to one’s contribution instead of the current system, in which eve-
ryone is entitled to receive social benefi ts for unemployment, childcare, poverty, 
etc. The social discontent is instigated by media coverage of the supposed large 
spending on Roma integration and the miniscule, almost non-existent results. The 
latter is allegedly caused by the widespread corruption practices among the “Gyp-
sy” activists, Roma organisation leaders and European project consultants dealing 
with Roma integration. “Expert” opinions on the topic by scholars from the Centre 
for Demographic Policy4 are often used and quoted by both VMRO leaders and the 
media: 
4 The Centre for Demographic Policy is a recently founded NGO consisting of scholars, experts 
and activists with nationalist attitudes (including some VMRO leaders). Regularly, it publishes 
its own demographic reports, prognoses and evaluations that are widely spread by the mass 
media. The Centre claims to produce more “correct” and “true” statistical information on demo-
graphic issues than the offi cial demographic information released by sources like the National 
Statistical Institute, the Demographic Department of the Institute for Population and Human 
Studies at Bulgarian Academy of Sciences, etc.
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“The Centre for Demographic Policy calculated that annually 3.1 billion leva 
are spent supporting the Gypsy community in Bulgaria. Those funds include 
social benefi ts, child allowances, maternal benefi ts, and others, legally dis-
tributed to the Roma population. This means that every Bulgarian – from the 
infant to the old man – pays 50 leva monthly for Roma support, calculates 
Prof. Petar Ivanov.” (Roma build palaces using money set for their educa-
tion. In: Monitor Newspaper, Date of publication 3.12.2011)
According to the VMRO, during the years of the transition, the state has ne-
glected the interests/needs of the working and tax-paying Bulgarian citizens and 
has instead favoured the Roma minority by granting them generous benefi ts in-
cluding child allowances and thereby generating “a leeching sect pilfering from the 
Bulgarian majority” (Kostadinov, Kostadin. In: Desant (Debark) Newspaper, Date of 
publication 26.2.2012)
The VMRO leaders see the main reason for advantaging the group of Roma and 
the disenfranchising of the larger part of “Bulgarians” in the Roma voting power. 
During elections, Roma votes are often illegally purchased by political agents sway-
ing election results in the Roma neighbourhoods. According to the VMRO posi-
tion, maintaining the Roma marginalisation and poverty is seen as a prerequisite 
for continuing the illegal vote trade and as such benefi ts only politicians’ interests. 
In the VMRO activists’ views, the Roma are “political players” who can be easily 
manipulated and who are served by the state, which in turn burdens its tax paying 
citizens. The Roma represent “the main electoral body” (Dzhambaski A., Interview 
SKAT TV: 21.3.2012). “There are no reasons for a special treatment of Roma and to 
grant them more privileges.... the state discriminates Bulgarians, because Roma are 
more important voters”, continued Dzhambaski in the same interview. According 
to the VMRO, the state refrains from responding to the problems with the Roma 
minority because: 
“Gypsies are the only ethnic group in the country which reproduces, but 
this does not prevent the politicians to concoct new privileges for them in 
order to receive their votes. We see an excellent example for the saying “the 
sick carries the healthy one”. The sick Bulgarian nation is forced to carry on 
its back the Gypsies who are multiplying like cockroaches.” (Kostadinov, 
Kostadin. In: Desant (Debark) Newspaper, Date of publication 26.2.2012)
4.3 “OUR money for THEIR (Gypsy) kids”
The fear of turning Bulgaria into a “Gypsy” country and the outrage of the perceived 
preferential treating of the Roma minority is widespread in the media – newspapers, 
forums and blogs:
“I heard the following news on the radio: We are facing a demographic ca-
tastrophe, warned the professors from the Centre for Demographic Policy. 
According to their forecasts, which are based on the offi cial census data, 
in 2050, there will be 3.5 million Gypsies in Bulgaria, 1.2 million Turks and 
barely 800 thousand Bulgarian people. Personally for me that is scary.” 
(Demographic Collapse in Bulgaria. In: Framar forum, Date of publication 
12.1.2012)
“WHOSE children do they [the politicians – T.K.&E.D.] want to spend OUR 
money on? On THEIR (Gypsy) children! On the one hand, we are strength-
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ening the “occupants”, on the other the traitors [...] (Spending funds – for 
police or for children? In: Sega (Today) Newspaper forum, Date of publica-
tion 12.12.2011)
“The Gypsy woman with fi ve kids, receiving fi ve child allowances, on top, I 
don’t know what, social benefi ts, then for 2-3 of them she receives disability 
payments (because they are registered with chronic diseases) making 1500 
leva per month. They live in the slums, the Gypsy father drives a new Mer-
cedes. The Bulgarian mother with two children receives 70 leva child allow-
ance and roughly 340 leva salary, and her husband drives his father’s Fiesta 
from 20 years ago. So! Who’s better off. Where does the welfare go?! I am 
not against helping those in desperate need, but being pikey has become a 
profession […]” (Spending funds – for police or for children? In: Sega (To-
day) Newspaper forum, Date of publication 12.12.2011)
“In the end, those who work do not reproduce in more than 1:1 ratio, often 
at a lower rate, while those who do not work, reproduce intensively. They 
acquire greater infl uence over political players. Policies are prepared for 
them, programs are penned, fi nancing and funds are planned. The welfare 
spending increases. The country becomes a bigger distributor, burdening 
the good citizens and serving the scroungers. Until the moment of crisis 
when everything crashes down. We arrived exactly at the turning point. But 
who cares?” (Spending funds – for police or for children? In: Sega (Today) 
Newspaper forum, Date of publication 12.12.2011)
These excerpts from internet forums demonstrate that worries about high fertil-
ity of Roma population are linked to people’s increasing concerns of the economic 
diffi culties experienced by an average Bulgarian family consisting of working par-
ents with one or two children. Over the last 20 years of transition ordinary people 
paid a very high price for economic and social transformations. Many of them be-
came more sensitive and demanding towards the post-communist governments 
which, by contrast to the previous communist governments, are expected to act in a 
most democratic way that guarantees social justice. As Susan Gal and Gail Kligman 
state: “[…] the issue of reproduction is one of the means by which the morality and 
desirability of political institutions is imagined […]” (Gal/Kligman 2001: 28). 
The national ideology namely exploits people’s demographic fear and distrust in 
demographic and social politics of the post-communist state that endows the “Gyp-
sy” minority with social benefi ts, and thus supposedly drains the meagre social wel-
fare budget of the country. Keeping in mind the social structure of the contempo-
rary Bulgarian society in which the middle class strata represents a tinny segment 
and almost 45 percent of the population live at risk of poverty and severe material 
deprivation (EU-SILC 2012), nationalists gamble with the individuals’ perceptions of 
what is an un/fair social re-distribution. Outbursts of nationalism are illustrated in 
the hate speech used: The Roma minority is portrayed as “scroungers”, “leeching 
sect”, “cockroaches”, and “pikey”. The use of dichotomies5 is a common strategy to 
5 Lundgren and Ljuslinder (2011: 165-183) describe how the dichotomization strategy is used for 
presentating population ageing in the media: old against young, economic active against sup-
ported, disaster against growth, etc.
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underscore the inferior nature of the Roma minority: our (Bulgarian money) against 
their (Roma kids), our (Bulgarian) money against their (Roma education), poorly paid 
workers (Bulgarians) against people living on social benefi ts (Roma mothers with 
many kids), honest citizens (Bulgarians) against corrupted voters (Roma), under-
privileged (Bulgarians) against privileged (Roma), disappearance (of ethnic Bulgar-
ians) against proliferation (of Roma). Therefore, the nationalists constantly produce 
borders, which divide the nation into two antagonistic parts – “we”, the ethnic Bul-
garians and the threatening “others”, the Roma.
5 The link between nationalism and pronatalism 
The nationalist vision of the future of a country goes hand in hand with pronatal-
ism, understood as a state policy targeting an increased birth-rate (King 1998, 2001, 
2002; Lee et al. 1991; Rivkin-Fish 2003; 2010). Usually, pronatalism fl ourishes during 
periods of fertility decline. In a context of increasing nationalism, pronatalism as a 
special state policy targets specifi c family types by taking into consideration their 
ethnic makeup.
In the VMRO’s demographic vision, the state should support fertility of Bulgar-
ians and restrict the Roma birth-rate. According to public opinion, however, the 
current policies lead to the opposite effect. To bring about the desired results, the 
VMRO offers a set of measures: differentiated access to family benefi ts and allow-
ances, which are only granted to families with one or two children. The support for 
any further child, is only available to parents with secondary education. Implicitly, 
this measure assumes that only educated (Bulgarian) families with one or two chil-
dren should be entitled to state support. Thus, higher fertility as a particular feature 
of the reproductive models of the non-Bulgarian ethnic groups would be tacitly dis-
couraged.
These restrictive measures are widely supported by Bulgarians. The question, 
which was posed in an internet forum “Should the birth-rate in Bulgaria be lim-
ited to up to 3 children and to cancel child support for the next parenting (VMRO’s 
proposal)?” was approved by 63.1 percent of 1088 voters. 30.3 percent disapprove, 
4.8 percent could not decide and 1.7 percent had no opinion (Should the birth-rate 
in Bulgaria be limited up to 3 children. In: http://www.ndt1.com/polls, 6.4.2012). 
Some experts also support the idea that child benefi ts for the fourth and any 
further parenting should be discontinued:
“It is necessary for the government to immediately propose and for the Na-
tional assembly to pass a law, which regulates the following: give 35 leva, 
as currently done (if they can’t do more) for the fi rst child. For the second 
child, to support birth-rate among Bulgarians – give 50 leva and for the third 
– 70 leva, because it ensures positive natural growth, and for the forth – 35 
leva again. For all following children – no child allowance. Mothers who’ve 
given birth before reaching the age of 18, should not only be denied any 
child allowance, the underage mothers as well as their parents should also 
be taxed.” (Gavrilov: Taxes for mothers aged under 18. In: Duma newspa-
per, Date of publication 12.1.2012)
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The differentiated welfare support for childbirth which (implicitly) aims to penal-
ise higher fertility of the Roma population questions the equality of the individual 
right to receive state support for every child in the family regardless of parity. Re-
cently, the National Commission for Antidiscrimination, the preeminent state body 
on discrimination providing legal advice and monitoring, logged a complaint by a 
mother, who considers the differential state support for childbirth as unequal treat-
ment based on “personal status”: 
“The woman explained why all Bulgarian citizens are discriminated by the 
state policy. According to her, the law aiming to curb the high birth-rate 
among the Roma families by decreasing the allowance for the third and 
higher order birth, affects all ethnic groups.” (The birth bonuses are dis-
criminatory. In: dir.bg, Date of publication 12.4.2012) 
The Commission reviewed the complaint and acknowledged the discriminatory 
implication in the offi cial policy of the state with regard to child benefi ts. As a result, 
it sent a letter to the Ministry of Labour and Social Policy in which the varying bo-
nuses at birth are qualifi ed as an indirect discrimination based on “personal status”. 
Thereupon, the Ministry published an offi cial response stating that the current 
social policy stimulates families to have two children and that is why the bonus at 
birth for a second child is higher. The Ministry rejects “the claims for a connec-
tion between the bonus at birth and the goal of limiting fertility in a specifi c ethnic 
group” as “completely ungrounded” (The birth bonuses are discriminatory. In: dir.
bg, Date of publication 12.4.2012)
One of the pillars of the demographic policy, according to the VMRO, is the state 
support for infertile families in Bulgaria. The special interest in this group is fos-
tered by the observation that infertility is more common among ethnic Bulgarians 
and that supporting infertile couples to have children could partly solve the demo-
graphic problem of the country. Childless couples are viewed as a potential source 
of population increase. Moreover, the responsible parenting of these couples would 
guarantee proper care and upbringing of children. 
“According to different sources, close to 250 thousand couples suffer from 
some sort of infertility. Infertility treatment methods used in the medical 
centres for assisted reproduction can help 60% of the couples, meaning 
that the Bulgarian nation has a potential for an increase with approximately 
150 thousand highly desired babies.” (VMRO 2012) 
Bulgarian society unanimously approves the state fi nancial support for infer-
tile couples. Nobody questions the redistribution of tax money to these families, 
although the committing of funds at times of economic hardships and low income 
rates is a legitimate concern. More importantly, by this support, the state legiti-
mises its power to control the nation’s reproduction. The demographic argument6 
is actively used by the initiators of this support – NGOs defending the interests of 
6 Experts reject the thesis that reproduction by assisted technologies could recover low levels of 
fertility. For more details see e.g.: Kotzeva/Dimitrova 2009.
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people with fertility problems as well as by medical specialists involved in infertility 
treatment. 
5.1 “The most dangerous strike is that of the mothers – they simply 
refuse to give birth”
In online forums, young people discuss the hardships of raising children and the 
defi cit of family-friendly policies by the state, labelling their position as “strike”. But 
who is the target of young mothers’ “strike”? Women share the view that they have 
to go on strike, i.e. to refuse having more than one child, because the employer (the 
state – in their view) does not fulfi l its responsibilities. One of the widely discussed 
topics in the forums is that the Bulgarian state owes money and services to the 
mothers – family support and income need to be increased, because they are insuf-
fi cient to support childbearing; young people need to be provided e.g. with work. In 
this way, the reproduction changes from a personal or a family decision to a state 
decision. This etatist type of attitudes are widely exploited by the nationalist opin-
ion leaders. In the nationalist vision, it is the state which carries full responsibility 
for the country’s “demographic crisis”. The refusal to have children expresses the 
breached contract between women, family and the state .This is why, in the popular 
belief, as well as in the nationalist “claims”, the “demographic crisis” symbolises the 
disintegrating statehood. 
In the nationalist discourse, the nation represents an extended family, and the 
family reproduces the nation. This places an exclusive responsibility on the family 
to preserve the nation. Thus, nationalists criticise not only the state’s ignorance of 
the demographic issue but also families/women who escape their responsibility 
for the future reproduction of the nation.7 In the nationalist view, the erosion of the 
traditional family values, the decline of moral family norms, and the dilution of tradi-
tional gender roles in the modern society are emphasised as the main reasons for a 
reproductive mission of the family which is perceived faulty: 
“We conducted our research in three large university cities. The larger 
group of the respondents replied that they don’t want to get married. Wom-
en argue that men have become more feminine, you can’t rely on them 
to support a family. Men, on the other hand, fi nd women to money driven 
and so on. These responses do not depend on the fi nancial status of the 
respondents – this is the opinion of both wealthy and poor. The truth is that 
even at the beginning of the 1990s, we scrapped education from school. The 
family teaches moral values, while the school – social ones. A generation 
grew up without those values, now children are considered as a burden, 
not as a value. And we are wondering why Bulgarians are degrading, why 
the nation is becoming dumber. That is why, because of the missing value 
system.” (Kostadinov, Kostadin: The third national catastrophe. Date of pub-
lication 15.5.2012)
7 Similarly, moral discourse on blaming women for rejecting motherhood and pursuing selfi sh 
priorities (professional career, etc.) has been enhanced by the Catholic Church and the national-
ist governments in the postsocialist Poland (Mishtal 2012: 153-169).
•    Tatyana Kotzeva, Elitsa Dimitrova784
In some internet blogs and forums, the demographic crisis is explained not so 
much by severe material restrictions experienced by the majority of Bulgarians, 
but by the lack of moral pillars, translated into “moral degradation” and “spiritual 
squalor” of generations born after 1989. In the forum discussions, the “demograph-
ic crisis” is part of the larger degradation of the state together with corruption, mafi a 
connections of the state, crime, economic crisis, high prices of utilities, low salaries, 
and similar calamities (Gypses Bullying Bulgarians. In: forum hooligans.bg, Date of 
publication 6.3.2012). The demographic crisis is viewed as a result and at the same 
time, as another manifestation of the moral debasement of Bulgarian society, in 
which the profane and the sinfulness are expressed in the rejection of traditional 
values like marriage, children and collective responsibility. 
6 Concluding remarks
The aim of this paper was to study how Bulgaria’s steep population decline dur-
ing the post-communist transitional years has been interpreted in the nationalist 
ideology and nationalist public consciousness. An analytical grid developed on the 
basis of theories of nationalism, particularly the idea of its resurgence in post 1989 
Eastern Europe (Altermatt 1998; Brubaker 2004), fi ltered through the concept of 
“reproduction as politics” (Gal/Kligman 2001), has been used to analyse main topics 
in the nationalist discourse on the population problem and declining birth-rates in 
contemporary Bulgaria.
In trying to shed light on the complicated relationship between nationalism and 
reproduction in the Bulgarian post-communist context, we start from the idea that 
reproduction is a key dimension of the relationship between the state and the citi-
zens in modern times. It becomes an object of a legitimised control exercised by the 
state by various policies and institutional mechanisms aiming to infl uence individu-
als’ reproductive decisions. 
Nationalism as one of the most infl uential ideologies of the modern and post-
modern societies constructs the essence of the reproduction policies: who can re-
produce the nation, how many children are needed for the nation-state to guarantee 
its continuity, who is responsible for the reproduction, what is moral in terms of 
distribution of social welfare – these are questions which defi ne the parameters of 
the political actions undertaken in the realm of family and reproduction. The analy-
sis of public discourse on the “population problem” and the “demographic crisis” 
manifests the main arguments of the ideology of (ethno)nationalism for the creation 
of the nation as “imagined community” (Anderson 1991). Nationalism seeks and of-
fers “solutions” for the demographic crisis by tacitly differentiating the social policy 
based on ethnicity, by rejecting immigration of people with “non-Bulgarian” origin, 
and by escalating pronatalist rhetoric and thus being nostalgic about lost traditional 
family values. Identifying themselves as “national responsible citizens”, VMRO’s ac-
tivists plead for the revival of the prestige of the “normal” family, but at the same 
time avoid the discussion on how to implement family-friendly policies.
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Nationalist ideology is grounded on the people’s sentiments and emotional at-
tachment to their homeland on one hand, but it is challenged by the ongoing pro-
cesses of Bulgaria’s integration into the European Union and the globalised world, 
on the other. In this context, anti-Roma campaign of the nationalist ideology (an-
ti-Tsiganism) of the nationalist ideology instead of constructive policy proposals 
leads to the reinforcement of negative stereotypes towards minorities and to an 
emerging of multiethnic tension. The nationalist divide of the nation into “worthy” 
and “non-worthy” segments of population violates the principle of universality of 
human rights and creates superiority of one ethnic group in the realm of reproduc-
tion. On the other hand, nationalists do not back practice of positive discrimination 
towards the Roma community on the ground of its disadvantaged position because 
this policy of favouring individuals would antagonise the rest of the population. All 
these contradictions of the nationalist discourse indicate its inability to offer con-
structive solutions to the demographic problem existing in contemporary Bulgaria. 
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